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This article introduces the special issue on New Perspectives on 
the Trust-Control Nexus in Organizational Relations. Trust and 
control are interlinked processes commonly seen as key to 
reach effectiveness in inter- and intra-organizational relations. 
The relation between trust and control is, however, a complex 
one, and research into this relation has given rise to various 
and contradictory interpretations of how trust and control 
relate. A well-known discussion is directed at whether trust and 
control are better conceived as substitutes, or as 
complementary mechanisms of governance. The articles in this 
special issue bring the discussion on the relationship between 
both concepts a step further by identifying common factors, 
distinctive mechanisms, and key implications relevant for 
theory building and empirical research. By studying trust and 
control through different perspectives and at different levels of 
analysis, the articles provide new theoretical insights and 
empirical evidence on the foundations of the trust-control 
interrelations.  
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Trust and control are two of the most studied concepts in the 
organization sciences and management literatures. After 
several decades of scholarly focus on control as governance 
mechanism, trust has become increasingly recognized as a 
central mechanism in the coordination of expectations, 
interactions, and behaviors within organizational relations.  
 
Partly because of processes of globalization, increasing 
flexibility of labor relations and virtualization of organizational 
forms, intra- and interorganizational work relations have 
become looser and less easy to monitor. Instead of hierarchical 
relationships that used to dominate the framing of work 
relations, lateral relationships and alliances have acquired 
importance (Bachmann, Knights, & Sydow, 2001; Sheppard & 
Tuchinsky, 1996), demanding increasing levels of trust to 
function effectively (Creed & Miles, 1996; Powell, 1996; Tyler, 
2003). Trust has become undoubtedly one of the key concepts 
in the analysis of intra- and inter-organizational relations. 
However, it would be wrong to assume that trust is a panacea 
to all problems in contemporary organizational relations. Trust 
can be harmful, as it encourages parties to suspend their 
judgment of others (Langfred, 2004), and it can lead to 
betrayal (Lane, 2001). By now, it is a matter of common 
understanding that trust and control enable effective 
functioning of individuals, teams, and organizations and are 
essential features of organizational life.  
 
Among the issues addressed while studying trust and control, 
the matter of how both constructs relate is one of the most 
controversial. Scholars have examined the relation between 
trust and control from multiple vantage points comprising 
varying levels of analysis. Although these various approaches 
have emphasized the complexity and importance of 
trust–control relationships, scholars have not yet proposed solid 
theoretical frameworks that can assist us in understanding how 
trust and control in general relate (Long & Sitkin, 2006). 
However, as it is evidenced by this special issue and other 
recent publications (e.g., Bachman et al., 2001; 
Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005; Long & Sitkin, 2006) scholars 
are starting to develop more well-defined ideas and propose 
more integrated frameworks on how trust and control relate.  
 
This special issue builds on and complements previous theory 
and research on trust and control. The main aim is to identify 
common foundations and key implications of both constructs 
that are relevant for theory building and future research. 
Consistent with the interdisciplinary focus of research on trust 
and control, the articles appearing in this special issue rep-
resent different disciplines, including organizational behavior, 
psychology, economy, and strategic management. Moreover, 
the authors approach trust and control at different levels of 
analyse ranging from interpersonal and intergroup to 
organizational and interorganizational levels. The articles 
propose or test integrated frameworks on how trust and control 
relate, both expected to contribute to the development of new 
perspectives and understandings. The article by Vlaar, Van den 
Bosch, and Volberda (this issue) proposes an integrated 
framework for analysis of the evolution of trust, distrust, formal 
control, and coordination in interorganizational relationships. By 
integrating and reconciling previous work emphasizing the 
dynamics associated with trust and control, the article 
contributes to a more comprehensive and refined 
understanding of the evolution of interorganizational 
cooperation. The article by Şengün and Wasti (this issue) tests 
the interaction between trust, control, and risk in long-term 
supply chains between pharmacies and drug warehouses in 
Turkey using the conceptual framework proposed by Das and 
Teng (2001). The article by Ferrin, Blight, and Kohles (this 
issue) introduces a conceptual model of the relationships 
among trust, monitoring, and cooperation in interpersonal and 
intergroup interactions, while systematically distinguishing 
between “own” and “others’” perspectives. The concept of 
isomorphism is used as a basis for developing this theory, 
observing that although the constructs may differ in structure 
across levels, they may still have similar functions. The article 
by Weibel (this issue) draws on self-determination theory and 
elaborates a theoretical framework to analyze conditions that 
lead to positive relations between formal control by the 
manager and subordinates’ trustworthiness.  
 
By bringing together these articles, we hope that this special 
issue will reflect the richness and range of the current research 
developments about how trust and control relate. In this 
introductory article, we first provide a clarification of the 
concepts and identify demarcations and key definitions that 
reflect how trust and control are approached by the authors in 
this special issue. Second, we discuss views scholars hold on 
how both constructs relate based on previous theory and 
research. Third, we discuss new perspectives and 
understandings related to the dynamics and contextual con-
tingencies of trust and control.  
Conceptual Clarification  
Trust and control refer to highly complex forms of social 
relationships and processes, whose definitions have been 
inherently elusive and often challenged among scholars (Reed, 
2001). Because both concepts have been studied within 
different contexts and approached through various disciplines, 
it is not surprising that varied, and sometimes divergent, 
conceptualizations of trust and control are found in the 
literature. This emphasizes the need to clarify boundaries and 
to understand how the trust and control concepts are 
approached in this special issue. Furthermore, the coexistence 
of trust and control within an array of entities ranging from 
individuals, dyads, groups, organizations, to interfirm alliances 
suggests that a multilevel approach is desirable (Das & Teng, 
2001; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Multilevel 
approaches provide researchers with a theory and research 
methodology that reflects the complexity and dynamics of trust 
and control.  
 
The majority of the articles in this special issue seem to 
embrace a multilevel approach. From the two articles 
addressing trust and control in the context of interfirm 
alliances, Şengün and Wasti (this issue) focus almost 
exclusively on the organizational level, whereas Vlaar et al. 
(this issue) combine the interorganizational focus with dyadic 
analyses of the relationship between the organizational 
managers involved in alliances. Ferrin et al. (this issue) depart 
from an individual analysis of own and others’ trust to explain 
trust, monitoring, and cooperation in interpersonal and 
intergroup relationships. Weibel (this issue) addresses trust in 
the context of manager–subordinate relationships but discusses 
it within the functioning of the formal control system of the 
organization.  
 
Trust  
 
Many definitions of trust have been put forward from varied 
fields of science. The apparent conceptual diversity has been 
reflected in regular reviews of the literature and research on 
trust (e.g., Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Hosmer, 1995; Kramer, 1999; 
Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Möllering, Bachmann, & Lee, 2004; 
Rousseau et al., 1998). People trust others based on 
assumptions that these others will behave in a certain way 
(R.C. Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) and that this will 
provide them with an expected desirable outcome (Deutsch, 
1962).  
 
Despite interdisciplinary differences most scholars agree that 
trust is essentially a psychological state that manifests itself in 
the behavior toward others (Kramer, 1999). As a psychological 
state, trust comprises positive expectations and the willingness 
to become vulnerable to the actions of others (Rousseau et al., 
1998). Positive expectations refer to the belief in the 
trustee(s): (a) ability or competence on various performance 
dimensions, (b) benevolence or goodwill toward the trustor, 
and (c) integrity or the willingness to fulfill the commitments to 
trustors (R. C. Mayer et al., 1995). This suggests that trust 
essentially comprises an individual and a relational component, 
respectively, regarding the characteristics of the trustor and of 
the trustee(s) and regarding the relationship between trustor 
and trustee(s) (R. C. Mayer et al., 1995). The willingness to 
become vulnerable to the actions of others associates trust with 
the risk that the behaviors of others can do you harm. 
Gambetta (1988), for instance, partly defined trust as the 
expectation that another’s action” will be beneficial rather than 
detrimental” (p. 217). This suggests also that trust is related to 
risk taking, in the sense that, by trusting, the trustor expects 
that the desirable outcome will materialize, in spite of the 
possibility of being disappointed (Boon & Holmes, 1991; 
Luhmann, 1988).  
 
The conceptualizations of trust described in the articles in this 
issue are consistent with the psychological state approach to 
trust and focus at least on two of the critical elements in its 
definition mentioned above. Vlaar et al. (this issue) and Şengün 
and Wasti (this issue) emphasize mostly competence and 
goodwill aspects of trust. Ferrin, et al. (this issue) adopt 
Cummings and Bromiley’s (1996) definition of trust “as 
individual’s or group’s belief that another individual or group 
makes efforts to uphold commitments, is honest, and does not 
take advantage given the opportunity” (p. 303), which is also 
consistent with the integrity and benevolence dimensions cited 
above. Weibel (this issue) emphasizes mainly the assessment 
of the trustee’s level of trustworthiness based on benevolence. 
Although trust is inherently relational, trustworthiness is 
relational in a limited sense because it is tied mainly to certain 
characteristics of the trustee.  
Control  
Control has been viewed as a process that regulates behaviors 
of organizational members in favor of the achievement of 
organizational goals (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Cardinal, Sitkin, 
& Long, 2004; Das & Teng, 2001). The control literature 
suggests that there are two main approaches to control. One 
approach focuses on the establishment and utilization of formal 
rules, procedures, and policies to monitor and reward desirable 
performance, that is, formal control. The other approach 
focuses on informal or social control and emphasizes the 
regulatory power of organizational norms, values, culture, and 
the internalization of goals to encourage desirable outcomes. 
Although Şengün and Wasti (this issue) take both approaches 
into account in their study, the other authors in this special 
issue focus essentially on formal control. Formal control is 
defined either with respect to the organizational degree of 
formalization or to the level of monitoring between individuals. 
In the article by Vlaar et al. (this issue) formalization fulfills not 
only a control function but also a coordination function. The 
coordination function helps partners to decompose tasks and to 
establish and to communicate the activities that have to be 
completed. This function has gradually received more 
systematic attention in the literature (e.g., Klein Woolthuis, 
Hillebrand, & Nooteboom, 2005; Madhok, 2002; K.J. Mayer & 
Argyres, 2004) and appears to be highly dependent on trust. 
Ferrin et al. (this issue) define monitoring as a form of control 
that reflects actions by one party to gain information about 
another party’s level of cooperation. Monitoring is considered a 
critical element of formal control because it provides parties the 
possibility of determining whether there have been deviations 
from agreed-on rules (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005). 
Weibel (this issue) describes control as a formal mechanism 
that managers use to direct subordinates toward the successful 
attainment of organizational goals (Flamholtz, Das, & Tsui, 
1985).  
 
Trust and Control Interrelating  
The relation between trust and control is a complex one, and 
research into this relationship has given rise to various and 
contradictory interpretations on how trust and control relate 
(Anderson & Narus, 1990; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Das & 
Teng, 1998; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). In particular, two 
main perspectives can be distinguished: the substitution 
perspective and the complementary perspective.  
 
From a substitution point of view, trust and control are 
inversely related, that is, low trust requires formal control and 
high trust allows for limited formal control (e.g., Dekker, 2004; 
Handy, 1993; Inkpen & Currall, 1997; Williamson, 1975). 
Conceptualizing trust and control as opposing alternatives has 
been a long tradition in management sciences (Knights, Noble, 
Vurdubakis, & Willmott, 2001). Some adepts of this perspective 
base their argument on the economic relevance of trust. Trust 
provides incentives for cooperation, reduces uncertainty, and 
increases information exchange (Arrow, 1974; Gambetta, 
1988; Gulati, 1995; Powell, 1996). Therefore, the higher the 
level of trust in relationships, the lower the costs of monitoring 
and other control mechanisms (Cummings & Bromiley, 1996; 
Handy, 1993; Williamson, 1975). Trust and control are 
considered to be alternative routes for arriving at stable orders 
to which social actors can orient their behavior (Gulati, 1995). 
Both constructs allow for the development of expectations with 
regard to social actors' future behaviors, and increase pre-
dictability (Luhmann, 1979; Nooteboom, 2002). Powell (1996) 
argued that in the absence of “natural” conditions for trust 
development such as familiarity based on past experiences or 
characteristics of similarity, interfirm collaborations tend to rely 
more on formal and institutional base arrangements, which can 
be more costly and time-consuming. Support for the sub-
stitution point of view has also been found in work relationships 
within organizations. For instance, Costa (2003) found that 
trust between members in work teams is positively related to 
cooperative behaviors and negatively to monitoring colleagues, 
indicating that trust can work as a substitute for control. 
However, despite various attempts (e.g., Anderson & Narus, 
1990; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995), there is no consistent 
empirical evidence that trust and formal control indeed 
substitute for each other.  
 
The complementary point of view, on the other hand, argues 
that trust and control can be mutually reinforcing and 
contribute to the level of cooperation needed in a relationship 
(Sitkin, 1995; Zucker, 1986). Proper formal control 
mechanisms can increase trust to the extent that objective 
rules and clear measures help to institute a “track record” for 
people to base their assessments and evaluations of others 
(Goold & Campbell, 1987; Sitkin, 1995). For instance, within 
interfirm collaborations legal regulation of interorganizational 
relationships is an important precondition for trust as it makes 
them more predictable (Luhmann, 1979; Zucker, 1986). 
Dodgson (1993) emphasized the importance of formalization to 
ensure continuity of successful interorganizational collaboration 
because trust on its own is a fragile governance mechanism, 
particularly in situations of continuous organizational change 
and high mobility of the work. 
 
From a contextual-based approach, Das and Teng (2001) 
suggested that the relationship between trust and control can 
be either complementary or substitutive in nature depending on 
the type of control. Formal control may undermine trust 
because the employment of strict rules and objectives means 
that members do not have the autonomy to decide what works 
best (Das & Teng, 2001). In this sense, trust and control act as 
substitutes. This is consistent with the view that trust, in 
particular goodwill trust, reduces the need to design and 
monitor contractual safeguards (Lui & Ngo, 2004). Social 
control, on the other hand, may complement trust to the extent 
that it emphasizes the creation of shared goals and norms, 
which are likely to increase mutual understandings and to 
breed trust. Şengün and Wasti confirm both these propositions 
while testing Das and Teng’s (2001) model in long-term supply 
agreements. Other researchers do take different stances over 
this matter. For instance, Vlaar et al. (this issue) argue that the 
starting levels of trust and distrust in the development of 
interorganizational collaborations will influence the degrees of 
formal coordination and control and the levels of performance 
achieved in early stages of cooperation, which then influences 
how managers interpret the behavior of their partners. As a 
result, trust, distrust, and formalization tend to develop along 
self-reinforcing paths. With an interpersonal and intergroup 
focus, Ferrin et al. (this issue) argue that although the relation 
between own trust and own monitoring and vice versa is of 
substitution, the relation between others’ monitoring and own 
trust can be either of substitution or of complimentarily. The 
valence of this relation is contingent on contextual factors and 
on how monitoring is experienced in that context. Weibel (this 
issue) elaborates on how monitoring by managers is experi-
enced by subordinates and how it can enhance their 
trustworthiness. If formal control is perceived as enabling 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness, subordinates can be 
expected to “take in” the values that are important to the 
manager, which promotes their trustworthiness. This argument 
is consistent with earlier findings showing that subordinates’ 
trust in managers is positively related to monitoring behaviors 
of managers (Bijlsma-Frankema & Van de Bunt, 2003) and with 
the idea that monitoring enhances the willingness of managers 
to become vulnerable in their relationships with subordinates 
through acts of delegation of empowerment (Spreitzer & 
Mishra, 1999).  
New Perspectives and Understandings  
The articles in this special issue broaden traditional 
perspectives on trust and control relationships and contribute to 
further research in several domains. By approaching trust and 
control from multidisciplinary and multilevel perspectives, 
scholars have opened up new questions and themes that enable 
new ways of theoretically making sense of the trust–control 
relationship. The articles propose and test integrated models 
drawn from diverse literatures ranging from game theory, 
negotiation, and interpersonal trust, to governance, 
organization governance, and interorganizational relationships. 
In the article by Ferrin et al., a theoretical model is proposed 
describing the relationships among trust, monitoring, and 
cooperation in interpersonal and intergroup interactions. The 
authors argue that a more explicit distinction between own and 
others’ trust, own and others’ monitoring, and own and others’ 
cooperation is critical for better understanding the relationships 
among trust, monitoring, and cooperation. By making this 
distinction between own and other, the authors are able to 
provide greater precision in how trust, monitoring, and 
cooperation are defined, and a more comprehensive and 
variegated view of the relationships among the constructs. The 
other three articles in this special issue emphasize the 
dynamics of trust and control in organizational relations (e.g., 
Vlaar et al., Weibel) and the relevance of the context in these 
dynamics (Şengün & Wasti).  
 
Coexistence and Dynamics of Trust and Control  
It has been noted that a minimum level of trust is needed for 
the success of any form of collaboration (Creed & Miles, 1996). 
This suggests that to have effective controls in any type of 
organizational relation a certain level of trust is needed (Das & 
Teng, 1998). Vryza and Fryxell (1997) found that trust makes 
control mechanisms more effective. After all, trust reduces the 
level of resistance and brings harmony to the controller- 
controllee relationship (Das & Teng, 2001). A lack of trust 
means that the firms will question the motive and competence 
of the controlling partners. Thus, without a certain level of 
trust, it will be difficult to accept control in relation to outcome 
measurements, to follow specified behavior patterns, or to 
share values. 
  
Of course, trust and control are not static phenomena. During 
business relationships, parties update their expectations and 
introduce changes regarding the trust, coordination, and control 
mechanisms that they have adopted (Bijlsma-Frankema & 
Costa, 2005; Wicks, Berman, & Jones, 1999). Such changes 
become more likely when the outcomes achieved in terms of 
the relational quality differ from the ones expected in early 
stages of cooperation. In this way, trust and formal control are 
found to be interrelated in various dynamic patterns (Larson, 
1992; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 
1995). 
  
The integrated framework proposed by Vlaar et al. (this issue) 
suggests that patterns of trust, distrust, and formal 
coordination and control tend to develop along self-reinforcing 
vicious or virtuous cycles in interorganizational collaborations. 
This observation is congruent with Zand’s (1972) spiral 
reinforcement model. Vlaar et al. (this issue) provide a 
comprehensive and refined understanding of these dynamics 
based on the level of trust and distrust between parties during 
the initial stages of cooperation and how these affect the 
development of trust and control at later stages of the coop-
eration. This derives from the impact of trust and distrust in the 
earlier stages of the cooperation on (a) formal coordination and 
control, (b) interorganizational performance, and (c) the 
interpretations that managers attribute to the behavior of their 
partners. Because partners tend to interpret each others’ 
behavior so that it reinforces existing preconceptions (March & 
Olsen, 1975; Weick, 1995), initial levels of trust and distrust 
strongly influence whether the behavior of partners will develop 
into spirals of distrust and defensive behavior with increasing 
emphasis on monitoring and control (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996), 
or into increasing levels of trust and commitment in a 
partnership (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005).  
 
Although formal control can become destructive and undermine 
the development of trust (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; 
Sitkin & Roth, 1993) by discouraging contributions to a 
relationship, Weibel (this issue) proposes a framework that 
identifies several mechanisms through which formal control can 
enhance trust. Through the lens of self-determination theory, 
she argues that formal control can have a positive effect on 
employees’ trustworthiness when it is perceived as enhancing 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Self-determination 
theory is useful in showing how to link characteristics of 
managerial formal control with subordinates’ intention to 
behave in a trustworthy fashion. The framework is used to 
organize empirical findings on the interplay of formal control 
and trustworthiness in various research streams, such as 
participation research, crowding-out theory, marketing theory, 
trust theory, and theory of organizational support. The study 
proposes that if managerial control enhances the three drivers 
of trustworthiness, formal control in conjunction with trust will 
contribute to organizational effectiveness. This proposition is in 
accord with earlier findings in trust and control research, which 
suggests that the controls that managers employ and their 
willingness to promote trust significantly affect subordinate 
performance on tasks and the quality of their relationships with 
subordinates (Sitkin & Long, 2006).  
 
Contextual Factors  
The influence of the context on the dynamics of the trust and 
control interrelation has been advocated by scholars addressing 
trust and control within and between organizations 
environments. Ferrin et al. (this issue) elaborate on the 
contingency influences on the valence of trust–control relations. 
For instance, employees have been found to trust their 
superiors less when they perceive that the superiors’ 
monitoring is intended to control their behavior (Etchegaray & 
Jones, 2001). However, if employees view their managers’ 
monitoring as a demonstration of care and as a precondition to 
provide feedback on performance, appreciate good work, and 
provide support and guidance, it will increase their trust in their 
managers (Bijlsma-Frankema & Van de Bunt, 2003). Weibel 
(this issue) elaborates on this issue by discussing several 
mechanisms that add to the potential to promote trust by 
formal control.  
 
Within interfirm collaborations, typologies have been proposed 
showing different degrees of embeddedness of trust and control 
in the structure and culture of institutions (Das & Teng, 2001; 
Powell, 1996). Indeed, contextual and cultural factors may 
explain a fair share of the variance in findings on the 
trust–control relations found so far. For example, the study of 
Şengün and Wasti (this issue), in spite of confirming the main 
propositions of the Das and Teng (2001) original framework, 
demonstrates also some limitations of this model when applied 
to a long-term supply agreement in Turkey. Contrary to the 
propositions of Das and Teng, goodwill trust is found not to be 
sufficient for taking relational risks in this context. Performance 
risk, on the other hand, is seen as unavoidable and is taken as 
given. However, even for this type of risk, parties rely mainly 
on goodwill trust and not on competence trust. The authors 
attribute these findings to the collectivist and to some extent to 
the uncertainty-avoiding nature of the Turkish culture (see 
Şengün & Wasti, this issue). Reframing questions about the 
trust–control interrelation to include the context in theoretical 
and empirical studies seems a promising turn to take, although 
the complexity of the matter studied is increased as well.  
 
As the context of organizations is constantly evolving, future 
developments may bring the need to develop other 
representations of trust and control in organizational relations. 
More empirical research is therefore necessary, as the 
understanding of the dynamics of trust and control is likely to 
grow in importance in the coming years. The evidence needed 
for dynamic analysis will not only provide more robust ground 
for making causal inferences but also will promote our 
understanding of how changes in one factor will lead to changes 
in another factor, for instance, how loss of trust in a 
relationship will change the nature of control employed.  
 
It can be concluded that our understanding of the trust–control 
dynamics has been and will be promoted by a shift to more 
theoretical explorations, as demonstrated in the articles in this 
issue. Based on the perspectives proposed in this special issue, 
we expect that a lot of promising work lies ahead in the pursuit 
of these new directions for research.  
 
This special issue has been put together with the purpose to 
reinforce integration and accumulation of insights regarding 
trust and control in organizational relationships. The scholars 
that have contributed to this special issue have accepted the 
challenge to be consciously integrative in their approaches to 
the functioning of trust and control in organizational relations. 
We wish to thank Group & Organization Management for 
providing the context and the incentives to support an 
integrated synthesis across disciplines. We deeply appreciate 
the scholarship and effort of the authors who participated in 
this special issue and also wish to thank the reviewers for their 
important contributions.  
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